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A B S T R A C T
This paper critically evaluates Transnational Corporations’ (TNCs) claimed adherence to the
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)’s ‘labour’ and ‘human rights’ reporting guidelines and examines
how successful the GRI has been in enhancing comparability and transparency. We found limited
evidence of TNCs discharging their accountability to their workforce and, rather, we found
evidence to suggest that disclosure was motivated more by enhancing their legitimacy. TNCs
failed to adhere to the guidelines, which meant that material information items were often
missing, rendering comparability of information meaningless. Instead, TNCs reported large vo-
lumes of generic/anecdotal information without acknowledging the impediments they faced in
practice.
1. Introduction: workforce reporting as part of corporate social responsibility (CSR) agenda
This paper examines the information that transnational corporations (TNCs) report on their workforce in accordance with the
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines. The analysis presented contributes to the debates around accountability and legitimacy
theory. That is, it examines the extent to which disclosure acts as a platform to embellish or exaggerate ‘good behaviour’ for the
purpose of boosting corporate image, rather than enhancing transparency for the purpose of discharging corporate accountability to
their workforce.
With the increasing attention paid to the impact that global value chains1 have on labour rights, this paper examines the extent
and quality of information reported on the internal and external workforce of the world’s largest companies. This is done using the
GRI reporting guidelines on labour (LA) and human rights (HR). The GRI provides detailed guidelines with the intention of raising
transparency and ultimately corporate accountability to stakeholders (GRI, 2011, p. 10).
The extant literature on workforce reporting tends to concentrate on internal workforce issues in one speciﬁc country (e.g.,
Williams & Adams, 2013) while workers further down the value chain (the external workforce) remain almost invisible. This paper
focuses on issues related to the external as well as the internal workforce. Issues relating to the employment conditions of the directly
employed workforce of the TNC diﬀer to those of reporting on the external workforce. For the former, reporting falls within the
boundaries of the TNC and under their direct authority, rendering access to data relatively easy. In contrast, reporting on the external
workforce falls outside corporate boundaries, making data access more complex. This is compounded by the international cross-
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border nature of such relationships, bringing additional legal, institutional and socio-cultural dynamics into play. So TNCs may have
reasons to ﬁnd reporting on the external workforce challenging.
Most of the human rights endeavours of civil society activities relating to the external workforce are not enforceable by inter-
national institutional benchmarks such as UN frameworks (Sikka, 2011) or by national-level government (Cooper, Coulson, & Taylor,
2011). At a deeper level, promoting the ethical treatment of supply-chain workers is challenged by the global institutional en-
vironment: the preeminent neoliberal hegemony on corporate governance not only privileges the interests of capital over labour, it
actively promotes the marginalisation of any interests competing with the pursuit of shareholder value (Sikka, 2010).
Focusing on the accountability of TNCs to their workforce in the complex context of global value chains, this paper provides
evidence on how TNCs, across sectors and countries of origin, treat information disclosure. It also comments on the extent to which
such reporting is part of a process of incremental progress or merely a platform to gain/maintain corporate legitimacy on the issue of
labour rights in the face of popular concerns. One distinguishing feature of this paper is the way we closely examine the detailed
information that TNCs are expected to have disclosed once they claim disclosure on their (internal and external) labour practices in
their GRI Index table. As part of the reporting process, the GRI index table enables TNCs to explicitly declare – and cross-reference –
the extent of their compliance to the reporting guidelines and thus illustrate the materiality of the information reported. The ex-
amination of index tables allowed us to reveal how important it was for TNCs to illustrate the level of adherence to this inter-
nationally respected set of guidelines (the GRI) even where within the contents of the full report, some TNCs were prepared to declare
the ‘immateriality’ of such disclosure on a variety of justiﬁcations. In the absence of mandatory audit or any meaningful assurance
provision, TNCs use the GRI Index table to gain and maintain legitimacy. We argue that, in doing so, TNCs are applying Lindblom’s
(1993) second, third and fourth legitimation strategies with little concern for the risk of being ‘found out’ or rebuked at a later stage.
This undermines the materiality and hence the comparability of the information that TNCs report.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a review of the existing literature on reporting practices on labour
issues and how this intersects with legitimacy theory. In the methods section, it is explained how the GRI enabled the examination of
the extent and quality of information that TNCs had disclosed. The results are then discussed in two parts; the ﬁrst concentrating on
information found on TNCs that had disclosed on their labour and human rights performance indicators and the second on the extent
to which TNCs had over-claimed the true extent of disclosure on each indicator. Conclusions and discussions are presented in the ﬁnal
section.
2. Accountability to the workforce: a global challenge
A company’s workforce is regarded as a ‘primary stakeholder’ in most models (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984).
Companies that claim a high degree of ethical behaviour toward their workers are likely to be perceived as more socially responsible
in general (Cohen, Taylor, & Muller-Camen, 2012) and therefore to be perceived more favourably as a result (Crane, Matten, &
Spence, 2008).
A company’s concern for workers’ welfare can be traced back to the philanthropists of the nineteenth century, when the impulse
to improve employees’ welfare was deemed to be mutually beneﬁcial (Cannon, 1994). In the twentieth century, such philanthropic
approaches were superseded by more instrumentalist concerns about satisfying institutionalised forms of employee interests through
collective bargaining. However, due to the decline in unionization globally (Wailes, Bamber, & Lansbury, 2011) and increased labour
market deregulation it has become more diﬃcult to promote standardised company employment practices. In the developed world,
for example, companies adhere to a range of national and supranational regulatory regimes regarding employment, making gen-
eralised policies in companies transcending borders diﬃcult to standardise. Hence, corporations tend not to consider employee issues
as a major component of social responsibility, leaving little scope for worker-related CSR initiatives beyond national-level legal
compliance. In developing countries, however, the levels of regulation and the enforcement mechanisms that protect workers’ rights
are considerably lower than those in developed countries (Crane & Matten, 2010). In such settings, employees tend to be viewed at
best in a paternalist vein and at worst in a unitarist vein (Fox, 1966) wherein labour-as-cost is the primary orientation for human
resource policy.
The concept of accountability to the workforce is rather complex for TNCs. Traditionally, TNCs have been attracted to low-cost
workforces and relaxed labour standards in developing countries (Dicken, 2007). However, more recently greater attention has been
paid to global value chains (Gereﬃ & Lee, 2012), a perspective which considers the international workforce in a more nuanced way
than some of the more unilateral notions of the international division of labour. Edwards and Kuruvilla (2005) focus on the internal
and external power dynamics within global value chains and show how their interdependencies can vary between TNCs, resulting in
diﬀerent implications for the workforce in each case.
TNCs that organise, manage and govern the global value chains have a signiﬁcant impact on the gains achieved by suppliers and
hence workers (Gereﬃ, Humphrey, Kaplinsky, & Sturgeon, 2001). However, the shareholder-value orientation of (in particular
Anglo-Saxon) TNCs which dominates their governance structures (Ezzamel, Willmott, & Worthington, 2008; McSweeney, 2009) is
regarded as a major impediment. Sikka (2011) argues that while civil and political rights are manifestly the imperative by-products of
economic growth, corporations view economic growth in terms of ﬁnancial and contractual obligations whereby social, cultural and
political rights (which provide a conducive setting for human rights) are ignored and excluded. More broadly, Sikka (2010) alludes to
how, under neoliberalism, nation states – particularly in developing countries – are incentivised to compete to attract capital (from
TNCs) by making inducements and concessions (at the expense of, for example, welfare of the workforce). Based on this ideology,
contemporary accounting practices are designed to promote shareholder supremacy by reducing costs such as wages and other labour
related expenses (Sikka, 2015). Thus, it should not be surprising that, in national settings with an emphasis on shareholders, TNCs can
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treat reporting on their employees as a tool to serve the interest of their shareholders rather than those of their workforce.
Considering the complex nature of global value chains, one of the challenges is to introduce some form of eﬀective enforcement
mechanism to help mitigate labour rights abuses below those directly employed in TNCs (Stephen, 2002). While the dominant legal
structure and governance mechanisms are shareholder-oriented, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world, respecting and protecting
labour rights could still become an integral part of decision making (Muchlinski, 2012; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). In such settings,
governments’ endeavours to promote CSR reporting often come to no avail as there is an absence of the necessary institutional
infrastructures in place to ensure their eﬀective implementation and functioning (e.g., Lauwo, Otusanya, & Bakre, 2016).
Due to the increasing pressures for global convergence of CSR standards and the manner in which TNCs are expected to illustrate
their involvement in CSR (Davis, Whitman, & Zald, 2010, p. 39), many TNCs present an account of their social and environmental
performance (Fortanier, Kolk, & Pinkse, 2011) by reporting large volumes of social and environmental information in an attempt to
illustrate their accountability to their wider stakeholders. In doing so, they are also expected to identify and understand which of their
economic impacts matter, for example, to the workforce and how they can deﬁne and manage their responsibilities2 and subsequently
engage with the relevant stakeholders to enhance their accountability (Campbell, 2005). However, TNCs are often not actively
engaged with local communities and CSR practices are often not adopted by subsidiaries or suppliers in developing countries,
contrary to rising expectations (Christmann & Taylor, 2001). All this highlights the complexity of value chains where there can be
discrepancies between what TNCs may intend in relation to their workforce and what is achievable in reality. In occasions when ‘…
there is a conﬂict about the objectives of social activity … accounting information has an ideological function in that it is used to
legitimize particular activities or rationalize past [corporate] behaviour.’ (Cooper & Sherer, 1984, p. 223). Under such circumstances,
TNCs report information in an attempt to illustrate their transparency and hence elevate their accountability.
3. Theoretical framework: accountability or legitimacy?
Companies claiming to treat their workforce ethically (Gray, Adams, & Owen, 1996) would be expected to provide an account of
their actions by reporting on workforce-related conduct and procedures. However, in the absence of mandatory reporting require-
ments, social and environmental reporting may not necessarily lead to enhanced transparency. Instead, such voluntary reporting can
be used by TNCs as a means of depicting the appearance of being transparent with the purpose of enhancing legitimacy. In eﬀect,
such reporting can act ‘… as a corporate veil that simultaneously [provides] a new face to the outside world while protecting the
inner workings of the organisation from external view.’ (Hopwood, 2009, p. 437).
Because transparency can never be achieved, acknowledging the limits within which accountability3 can be achieved is the ﬁrst
step towards any meaningful reporting. In addition, the recognition of, and engagement with, legitimate stakeholders is an essential
step towards meaningful social reporting (Cooper & Owen, 2007) and of discharging accountability. Roberts (2009) regards this as
‘intelligent’ accountability, calling for an active enquiry and engagement with stakeholders (i.e., listening, asking questions and
observing evidence as how corporate claims are put into action) over time. This would ultimately engender trust between TNCs and
their stakeholders, and hence the discharge of accountability.
In essence, TNCs’ relationship with their stakeholders is key to securing legitimacy and continuing survival. Under legitimacy
theory, a legitimate organisation constantly ensures the congruence of its value system with that of the wider society (Lindblom,
1993) and gains its legitimacy only when its relevant public assesses its value system and perceives it as acceptable (Patten, 1992). It
is only then that a company is given its licence to operate and gains access to its vital resources such as the labour market
(O’Donovan, 2002). The relationships between organisations and their stakeholders are complex and are shaped by implicit and
explicit terms of the social contract, asserting the expectations that stakeholders have of the TNCs (e.g., Deegan & Unerman, 2011;
Gray et al., 1996).
For TNCs whose value chains operate in diﬀerent geographical locations – often developing countries with varying social norms
and values – the nature of relationships with their extended workforce varies. It is not unknown for there to be discrepancies between
what TNCs do and what is expected of them at any point in time (a legitimacy gap) or for them to report information as a response to
this discrepancy (O’Donovan, 2002) to either maintain their legitimacy or to mitigate pressures on them (Milne & Patten, 2002). In
situations when there is a threat to TNCs’ legitimacy (because they are not discharging their accountability, O’Dwyer, 2002), re-
porting is used as a legitimation tool rather than a mechanism to discharge accountability (Gray & Bebbington, 2000).
TNCs can report on their workforce either to discharge accountability to their stakeholders and gain legitimacy (if reporting is
intended to discharge accountability – i.e., intelligent accountability as argued by Roberts, 2009) or to maintain/repair their le-
gitimacy. In this paper, we consider that in the former instances, companies are expected to closely adhere to the GRI reporting
guidelines as an endeavour to discharge their accountability to their workforce if they have invested in techniques and procedures
that could result in a high level of conformance with the GRI guidelines. For the latter group, companies can declare compliance with
the guidelines and fail (or decide not) to report detailed information (as per guidelines) to gain or maintain their legitimacy. For this
group of TNCs, ‘declaring’ compliance with the guidelines is more likely to be an attempt to gain or maintain legitimacy of their
human resource management policies that is in line with the international guidelines. In doing so, companies’ reporting can be in line
2 At the same time, it is important to note that CSR is perceived diﬀerently in each individual country and depending on the local cultures and customs, the
expectations of what CSR is going to deliver can vary considerably from one country to another (Katz, Swanson, & Nelson, 2001).
3 The conscious acknowledgement of the impossibility to achieve full transparency could be the basis for a very diﬀerent sense of responsibility that in turn might
allow for a very diﬀerent enactment of accountability (Roberts, 2009, p. 958).
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with the second, third or fourth strategies (as adopted from Lindblom, 1993) discussed below:
1. to change the standard for the treatment of their workforce in conformance with the GRI guidelines, and subsequently inform
their international audience of the changes;
2. not to change the way they treat their workforce, but to demonstrate and justify the appropriateness of how they treat their
workforce and are therefore in compliance with the GRI guidelines;
3. endeavour to alter the perceptions of their relevant public of the key issues by associating themselves with symbols that have a
high legitimacy status (e.g., claiming adherence to the GRI reporting guidelines) while not reporting as per GRI speciﬁcations;
4. endeavour to alter societal expectations by aligning them with the way they report on the treatment of their workforce and claim
conformance with the GRI guidelines.
The existing literature predominantly discusses and presents evidence in support of companies reporting social and environmental
information to gain, maintain or repair their legitimacy (e.g., Campbell, Craven, & Shrives, 2003; Deegan, Rankin, & Tobin, 2002;
Kilian & Hennigs, 2014; Liesen, Hoepner, Patten, & Figge, 2015; Milne & Patten, 2002; Nègre, Verdier, Cho, & Patten, 2017; Tilling &
Tilt, 2010; Patten & Zhao, 2014). A smaller number of studies have examined reporting on workforce issues and have supported
legitimacy theory. For example, Kamal and Deegan (2013) examined a sample of Australian textile and garment companies operating
in Bangladesh and found that, irrespective of international concerns about working conditions and safety at workplace, companies’
related disclosures fell short of the expected international standards and most disclosures were aimed at maintaining legitimacy and
meeting the expectations of the local communities, resulting in limited accountability and transparency. In another study, Williams
and Adams (2013) found that a bank’s reporting on its employees between 1980 and 1995 was more inﬂuenced by legitimacy
considerations in a broader social-organisational context than by the motivation to enhance transparency and accountability to/for
their workforce. Another relevant study is that of Boiral (2013) who closely examined the quality of information reported by 23
companies in energy and mining sectors using the GRI framework and found evidence in support of legitimacy theory. Along the same
lines but in more detail, Diouf and Boiral (2017) sought the perception of socially responsible investment practitioners in Canada. They
found that while GRI is viewed favourably as a work-in-progress, companies are perceived to select, adapt or modify GRI indicators to
project a favourable image among their stakeholders (while avoiding negative aspects). Lack of comparability, timeliness and re-
liability of information were the main weaknesses highlighted.
4. Labour standards and the Global Reporting Initiative
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) labour standards provide a logical benchmark to assess labour practices around the
globe. Core labour standards were adapted in 1998 with a view to establish a balance between procedural justice and social rights
(Alston, 2005). This is the ‘decent work’ agenda (ILO, 2014). The standards also require a process and some have questioned the shift
from ILO standards constituting a mandatory to that of a voluntary code and the development of the notion of ‘soft regulation’ as a
means of governance on labour standards (Kuruvilla & Verma, 2006; Sobczak, 2006; Wells, 2007). Voluntary initiatives have been
criticized for numerous reasons: (a) they are dependent on the ‘spotlight of brand activism’ which is both ‘roving and random’, (b)
they deﬂect from the activities of sub-contractors working directly for TNCs and where the worst abuses occur, and (c) corporate
codes are ‘only as good as those that wrote them’ (Royle, 2010, p. 263). However, while these criticisms may be true of TNCs
complying to their own voluntary codes, they may not necessarily hold true, on all three points, where they are subject to external
standards. It is argued that external standards can be of some assistance in reducing labour rights abuses down the value chain (Nadvi,
2008).
It is with these points in mind that the GRI may address some of these gaps. GRI was established in the late 1990s to introduce a
framework that could serve the interests of investors and civil society organisations in benchmarking companies’ activities. The ﬁrst
set of guidelines was published in 2000.4 The GRI itself is an independent not-for-proﬁt organisation based in Amsterdam, governed
by a 16 member board, advised by a 100 member ‘stakeholder council, both drawn from and to represent the interests of business (via
appointments from TNCs), labour (through appointments from global union federations) and civil society (via appointments from
non-governmental organisations).
GRI has been the most popular framework worldwide5 and established a momentum of legitimacy among key stakeholders in its
early stages (Brown, de Jong, & Levy, 2009). The guidelines are devised based on consultations with a range of stakeholder groups
from all over the world so that a broad range of issues are reﬂected in the guidelines, making them applicable to a wide range of
organisations including small enterprises, NGOs,6 large TNCs and public sector organisations (GRI, 2011, p. 2). The main intention of
the GRI is to harmonise sustainability reporting practices so that, as with ﬁnancial reporting practices, consistency and hence
comparability of the reports can be achieved for companies around the globe (Willis, 2003). Even though the growth and maturity of
the GRI has resulted in the overall improvement of sustainability reports, there are doubts about its favourable impact on the
4 The guidelines go through an intensive revision process by a group of stakeholders in every couple of years to implement the latest changes. After the full set was
published in 2000, the second generation of guidelines, G2, were published in 2002, GRI G3 in 2006, GRI G3.1 in 2011 and G4 in 2013. The diﬀerences between G3
and its successors (G3.1 and G4) are minor. For example, the principle of materiality remains the same in G4 as it was in G3. G4 makes more explicit links between
materiality and the management and performance information organisations should report on.
5 Adopted by 78% of the largest 250 global companies in 2011; 80% in 2013, 74% in 2015 (KPMG, 2013, 2015).
6 Non-Government Organisations.
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comparability of reports, of the overall transparency of companies (Toppinen & Korhonen-Kurki, 2013) and of its ability to encourage
the inclusion of sustainability into decision making processes (Adams, 2015). Despite the guidelines representing a means of en-
hancing corporate accountability (e.g., Bowen, 2000; Willis, 2003), evidence suggests that the momentum for adoption has been
thwarted – possibly due to the perception that stakeholder needs are not being suﬃciently met (Levy, Brown, & De Jong, 2010).
Further criticisms laid against the GRI guidelines highlight that many organisations adopting the guidelines do not necessarily
witness improved performance and can often manipulate the guidelines just to appear to be more transparent (Moneva, Archel, &
Correa, 2006) while in truth it is business as usual for most companies (Milne & Gray, 2013).
In this paper, we analyse reports written to GRI G3 reporting guidelines. The guidelines emphasise the attention TNCs should pay
to the materiality7 of information as well as identifying and illustrating engagement with their stakeholder when reporting in-
formation. In line with the KPMG’s (2013, p. 8) deﬁnition of materiality, we take the view that companies provide ‘material’ in-
formation when they: (1) identify the key issues that have the greatest potential impacts on their workforce (whether internal or
external) and (2) make clear the process they have used to assess materiality; this clarity should incorporate the involvement of their
workforce as well as how they have responded and provided feedback to their workforce. In this paper, we have focused on the GRI
workforce related guidelines that outline speciﬁcations on how material information on diﬀerent aspects of workforce (e.g., iden-
tiﬁcation of their key issues and active engagement with the workforce) can be reported.
Our choice of the GRI guidelines as a benchmark for employee-related disclosure is based on a number of rationales. First, GRI
provides the most comprehensive set of reporting guidelines available for the comparison of reporting by companies (Sutantoputra,
2009; Vigneau, Humphreys, & Moon, 2015). Second, a wide range of stakeholder groups from diﬀerent continents took part in the
development of the GRI guidelines and its performance indicators. The international steering committee that oversees the activities of
the GRI has representatives from diﬀerent stakeholder groups, corporations and the UN (Reynolds & Yuthas, 2008, p. 53). Third, the
requirement to cross-reference and to index and the existence of speciﬁc guidelines for compliance on each category, reduces the
need to develop a coding frame – which would inevitably be subject to normative judgement or interpretation.8 The guidelines
provide a systematic approach to the preparation and presentation of information with an emphasis on stakeholder engagement.9
Hence, companies that adopt the guidelines need to have certain systems or procedures in place before they can fully adhere to them.
In this paper, the guidelines enable us to examine information characteristics (e.g., completeness, and comparability) of information.
Using the GRI G3 guidelines, we examine how companies report on their workforce by concentrating on: (1) their labour practices
and (2) the employment-related aspects of the human rights category. While the former covers worker issues internal to the orga-
nisation, the latter covers issues relating to the workforce outside the organisation and often in their value chains in developing
countries (Ehnert, Parsa, Roper, Wagner, & Muller-Camen, 2016). In order to examine the two sets of workforce-related issues, we use
the only two GRI categories that relate to the workforce.10: (i) ‘Labor Practices & Decent Work’ (LAs) and aspects of (ii) ‘Human
Rights’ (HRs). The LA indicators are speciﬁcally aligned to ILO labour standards and the ILO decent work agenda11 There are nine
core LA indicators and ﬁve ‘additional’ ones. The HR indicators are based on generally accepted norms and principles such as the UN
Declaration of Human Rights and the core conventions of the ILO (GRI, 2013). Of the nine HR indicators, six are core and three are
‘additional.’ In this paper, we concentrate on GRI core indicators (and not on additional indicators) as they are designed to cover all
material information that can relate to the workforce (GRI, 2011, p. 7).12 For each performance indicator under the LA and HR
categories, the GRI lists a number of necessary compilations, allowing us to examine the completeness and hence comparability of
information.
4.1. Labour practices and decent work (LA)
The extant labour and decent work literature tends to be based on studies focusing on single-country cases rather than looking
into global trends. For example, there have been a limited number of equality-related studies over the years, among them the work of
Adams and Harte (1998) on the changing perception of women in UK banking and retail sectors; Adams, Hill and Roberts (1995) on
corporate equal opportunities (non) disclosure; Adams and Harte (2000) on the potential for social accounting on making dis-
crimination visible; and Grosser and Moon (2005) on the workplace reporting of workplace gender mainstreaming. Earlier studies
show that disclosures on employment issues were most likely to come from European or South African companies (Roberts, 199013).
In another study, Adams et al. (1995)14 note that although there were substantial disclosures on employee-related issues, mostly on
7 According to the GRI guidelines (GRI, 2011), the ‘… materiality is commonly thought of as a threshold for inﬂuencing the economic decisions of those using an
organisation’s ﬁnancial statements, investors in particular’ (p. 8).
8 As Gray and Gray (2011) point out, for example, an endeavour to deﬁne Human Rights or putting the issue of human rights (as per deﬁned by individual rights)
would be complicated.
9 In doing so, the GRI has adopted many of the conceptual reporting principles of the Financial Accounting Concepts (FASB, 1996) and provides guidance to prepare
information with similar qualitative characteristics as those for the ﬁnancial information (Reynolds & Yuthas, 2008).
10 There are six categories of indicators: (1) Economic (ECs), (2) Environmental (ENs), (3) Labour Practices & Decent Work (LAs), (4) Human Rights (HRs), (5)
Society (SOs) and (6) Product Responsibility (PRs).
11 According to ILO: ‘Productive employment and decent work are key elements to achieving a fair globalization and poverty reduction. The ILO has developed an
agenda for the community of work looking at job creation, rights at work, social protection and social dialogue, with gender equality as a crosscutting objective’.
(http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang–en/index.htm, (Accessed 18 March 2015)).
12 Additional information may be material to some of the companies and not to all.
13 Examined the reports of 200 multinational companies.
14 Examined social disclosures of 150 companies from six European countries.
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descriptive aspects (e.g., policies, description of activities, quantitative information such as number of employees and payroll costs),
very little information had been reported on more sensitive issues such as those required by the GRI reporting guidelines. A sig-
niﬁcant lack of transparency and accountability to employees is prevalent and companies should take strides towards genuine
accountability (intelligent accountability) to their employees by identifying and actively engaging with their employees (i.e., con-
sidering and responding to their employees’ needs and concerns in their decisions, policies and practices) (Williams & Adams, 2013).
While the whole nature of the relationship between companies and their employees tends to be inﬂuenced by a range of social,
economic and political aspects (Williams & Adams, 2013), in a global context, the nature of such relationships can vary substantially
from one region to another and hence so can the information that companies report on their employees. If TNCs report information in
an endeavour to discharge their accountability to their internal workforce, the identiﬁcation of the possible key stakeholders in
relation to the employees (e.g., employee representatives or other oﬃcials in their branches and subsidiaries based abroad) and
engaging with them actively to maintain a certain level of responsiveness to their issues will be an inevitable feature of the reporting
process. This is essential if companies are going to present material information that would allow comparability of their relationships
in diﬀerent regions.
4.2. Human rights (HR)
With TNCs being increasingly confronted with the question of labour rights abuses in their value chains – not covered under the
LA codes, above – the GRI category of ‘human rights’ contains some signiﬁcant sub-categories that directly relate to labour rights
aﬀecting workers in supplier organisations and those not directly employed by the TNC. There have been signiﬁcant developments in
human rights policies and their implementation (McPhail & Ferguson, 2016). While the literature on human rights reporting is even
more limited than that on employee reporting, there have been calls in recent years for more scholarly debate about human rights.
For example, Frankental (2011) calls for research on diﬀerent aspects of human rights including whether companies illustrate that
they have ‘… proper management and reporting systems in place to anticipate and address [human rights issues]’ (p. 764). Cooper
et al. (2011) focus on the right to work in a safe environment and present evidence that, in spite of the claims made by the Scottish
government to ensure workplace safety, in reality the social and political system in place failed to do so. More recently and in a
broader context, Posner (2016) highlights the emerging business and human rights agenda and discusses how a number of key areas,
such as value chains and labour rights, must be focused on for further development.
While TNCs exert economic veto power over developing countries, they are at the same time under pressure from international
activist groups to abide by human rights norms (Stephen, 2002). One of the key features of the UN Framework on Human Rights and
Business is the ‘moral’ responsibility of corporations to respect human rights irrespective of whether doing so is required by (local)
law. Arguably, if TNCs regard human rights as their moral responsibility, it is likely that the distinction between the responsibility to
respect and the duty to protect will begin to break down (Cragg, 2012, p. 32). Once the distinction between the two is blurred, TNCs
are more likely – in the absence of any international law and law enforcement mechanism – to take human rights issues more
seriously.15 At this stage, information disclosure can play a signiﬁcant role in promoting human rights and discharging corporate
accountability to employees and the workforce in companies’ value chains (Gallhofer, Haslam, & van der Walt, 2011). Islam and Jain
(2013) focus on major Australian garment and retail companies and found a low level of human rights disclosures. They explain that
soft disclosure regulations and multiple failed attempts to introduce hard regulations provide these companies with grounds to avoid
improvements in their human rights reporting. In a case study of a Tanzanian gold mine, Lauwo and Otusanya (2014) similarly
conclude that human rights obligations should become mandatory rather than being regarded as a duty of care.
While the concept of human rights can be viewed from diﬀerent perspectives (Muchlinski, 2012), the GRI reporting guidelines
focuses on whether or not human rights issues: ‘…are considered in investment and supplier/contractor selection practices. …[and
whether] … the indicators cover employee and security forces training on human rights as well as non-discrimination, freedom of
association, child labor, indigenous rights, and forced and compulsory labour’16 (GRI, 2011, p. 32). As Frankental (2011, p. 763)
notes, the GRI provides ‘… a widely recognised set of human rights benchmarks for companies, addressing wide-ranging issues …’
The GRI guidelines on human rights reporting requires companies to have systems and procedures in place to screen human rights
breaches and identify the course of action they need to take to rectify troublesome situations. Similar to the LA categories, we view
the human rights issues from a moral perspective whereby TNCs should acknowledge their responsibility but should also be able to
identify the workforce in their value chains and illustrate their endeavours to actively engage with the parties whose involvements
are essential to ensuring that breaches are avoided. This would require a systematic approach taking into account geographical
variation and the context in which global value chains operate. Similar arguments are presented by Gallhofer et al. (2011) who draw
attention to the importance of governance in promoting and protecting human rights and emphasise the fact that accounting (i.e.,
information disclosure) can have a signiﬁcant role in this process. More recently, McPhail and Ferguson (2016) consider the mo-
mentum in regulatory progress as the way forward for human rights reporting.
15 Gallhofer et al. (2011) point out that states and corporations have diﬀerent responsibilities in promoting and safeguarding human rights (p. 769). There is no
international law for human rights and it is only up-to the national law of the countries to have and then to enforce human right laws. One disadvantage of this is the
multinational companies can always move away from a country with strict human rights law to countries with less strict laws (Gallhofer et al., 2011).
16 The GRI recognises the following deﬁnitions of Human Rights: (1) Conventions and Declarations: United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its
Protocols; (2) United Nations Convention: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; (3) United Nations Convention: International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights; (4) ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of 1998 (in particular the eight core conventions of the ILO); and (5)
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (GRI, 2011, p. 32).
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5. Methods
5.1. Sample selection and data collection
For the purpose of this paper, a version of content analysis combined with more detailed text analysis of corporate sustainability
reports is used to measure the extent and nature of information reported on labour and human rights-related issues. Content analysis
has been referred to as a systematic and replicable technique that allows the examination of text using explicit coding rules
(Krippendorﬀ, 2012). However, rather than attempting to identify word patterns distributed within reports, the adapted form of
content analysis used here is based on the analysis of the index tables used on each report. As discussed earlier, the coding rules used
in this paper have been developed based on the GRI guidelines for the ‘Labour and Decent Work’ (LA) and ‘Human Rights’ (HR)
performance indicators. This analysis is supplemented by a second stage textual thematic analysis whereby the text in the relevant
cross-referenced sections of the reports are read and compared to the GRI guidelines to which they claim to be adhering.
The sample of TNCs selected was taken from the Forbes 250 largest companies list, ranked by size of assets, regardless of country
of origin or sector. Between June and October 2011, we collected the latest sustainability report from every company listed on the
Forbes 250 index. Most companies provided stand-alone reports, but for some companies the sustainability information was included
(generally as a chapter or two) in the ﬁnancial reports (so-called integrated reports) and in other cases the report was web-based only.
In our ﬁnal sample, we included only those companies that had formally adopted GRI as a benchmark and had also included a GRI
index table in their reports. Of the original Forbes 250, 215 had some form of sustainability report, 166 had claimed to have adopted
the GRI and of these, 131 had provided a GRI index table. It is the 131 GRI-indexed sustainability reports that form the basis of our
analysis.
In the GRI index table, companies are required to note the reporting status for each GRI indicator and indicate where, in the full
report, the relevant information is provided. For the ﬁrst step of our categorisation of company performance against GRI, we analysed
whether companies claimed to have reported either ‘full’, ‘partial’ or ‘no’ disclosure against each GRI LA and HR sub-category. For the
second stage, we compared the information presented in the full report, in relation to the status or reporting categorised in the index.
The coding scheme used for examining the information was based on the GRI guidelines for LA and HR indicators. Fig. 1 illus-
trates diﬀerent scenarios where a company’s disclosure can be recoded as ‘non-’, ‘partial’ or ‘full’ disclosure. Having examined the
actual information that companies had reported against the information they claimed to have reported (stage 2), a number of
scenarios could emerge where companies were considered to have had claimed their disclosures incorrectly. Scenarios S2, S4 and S5
indicate over-claiming when a company could have, for example, claimed to have full disclosure for a certain indicator (in its GRI
index table) but having examined the item, it became evident that the company had either over-claimed and reported no information
(i.e., S2) or only partially disclosed the item (i.e., S4).
If companies had claimed disclosure but did not make explicit whether this was ‘full’ or ‘partial’ disclosure, we considered that
they had claimed full disclosure. We also did not check whether companies had not claimed but reported the information somewhere
else in their reports (or on their webpages) (S2 and S3). We felt that was outside the scope of the paper. We did check for S7 and found
only three companies had ‘full’ disclosure while claiming ‘partial’ disclosure. In Fig. 1, all the possibilities that we examined are
marked by solid lines (S4–S9).
5.2. Scores
We developed a checklist where we included all the compilations for each LA and HR indicators, thereby facilitating the close
examination of non-disclosure, partial disclosure or full disclosure (for more details see Tables 2 and 4). When examining the
information, we considered an indicator to be fully disclosed only if the company had reported information on all its compilations. If
information had been provided on some of the compilations (i.e., at least one of the compilations), this was counted as partial
Fig. 1. Compliance with GRI Disclosure Guidelines.
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disclosure. Diﬀerent performance indicators have diﬀerent numbers of compilations ranging from 10 for LA7 to only one for LA4,
LA5, LA10 and LA14. All the HR indicators have two compilations.
6. Findings
In this section, we examine the extent of labour and human rights related issues reported by our selected companies in compliance
with the GRI reporting guidelines. This provides us with insight into the actual status of compliance with the guidelines and whether
full disclosure (as claimed by many companies) is indeed full disclosure.
First we examined the information which companies reported on each LA and HR indicators, classifying the tested information
into three categories of: ‘no disclosure’ (no relevant information disclosed), ‘partial disclosure’ (only some of the information relevant
to the indicator disclosed) and ‘full disclosure’ (all information required by GRI disclosed) (see Table 1). In the pursuit of additional
insight, we then examined the core indicators by looking at the ‘compilations’ for each indicator (see Table 2). We then examined
whether reports contained the information companies claimed to have reported in their GRI index tables (using the scenarios pre-
sented in Fig. 1).
6.1. Tested disclosures
6.1.1. Labour indicators
Table 1 presents the results of our examination of the information companies had reported on each LA and HR indicator. While a
number of labour indicators allow the identiﬁcation of key issues relating to the internal workforce (i.e., LA1, LA2, LA7, LA13, LA14),
there are indicators focusing on engagement with their workforce in the form of dialogue and the support they provide (i.e., LA4,
LA5, LA8 and LA10).17
For the full disclosure column, the three lowest scores were for the turnover by age/gender/region (LA2), composition of governance
bodies (LA13) and rates of injury/absenteeism by region (LA7) indicators. Of the three indicators, LA2 had the highest non-disclosure.
LA2 with 6 compilations requires a breakdown of information into age group, gender and region (see Table 2). A close examination
of the compilations shows that more companies (15% or more) had reported information by region and gender rather than by age group
(about 9% or less). For LA13, while most companies had reported by gender, a much smaller percentage of companies had reported by
minority group. In the case of LA7, many detailed disclosures are outlined in the guidelines. More speciﬁcally, the guidelines require
companies to report on injury rate, occupational disease rate, lost day rate, absentee rate, and absolute number of fatalities, each factor
broken down for region and contractors within region. Only 2 of the compilations had been reported by 11% and 15% of companies
while 5 were reported by less than 5%, suggesting that most companies failed to provide the extent of detail outlined under this
indicator. The highest overall disclosures (i.e. partial plus full disclosure) were observed for LA8 (82.5%), LA7 (at 75.6%) and LA13
(71%). For all three indicators, most had been reported ‘partially’, rather than ‘fully’. Once again, it emerged that more speciﬁc
information and detailed breakdown was generally lacking.
The least well reported indicators were: salary ratio: men/women (LA14 with 87% non-disclosure), minimum notice periods (LA5
with 80.2% non-disclosure) and turnover by age, gender and region (LA2 with 71.8% non-disclosure). The inclusion of category LA14
was relatively recent to GRI, which could, to some extent, explain the unavailability of the information in many reports. At the same
time, it has only one compilation (see Table 2) – meaning that companies had only to decide whether to disclose or not disclose this
one ratio. LA5 also has only one compilation and the same logic applies. In the case of LA2, a small number of companies had
provided a breakdown of information by gender and a smaller number by age.
Overall, the most frequently disclosed items were quite generic. When more speciﬁc issues were to be identiﬁed and reported on,
the percentage of companies reporting dropped considerably. For instance, companies were weak in reporting on their workforce in
Table 1
Tested Disclosures for Labour Indicators.
(1) No Disclosure (2) Partial Disclosure (3) Full Disclosure
Labour Indicators (%) (%) (%)
LA1 Workforce by employment type 30.5 58.8 10.7
LA2 Turnover by age/gender/region 71.8 26.7 1.5
LA4 % workforce covered by collective bargaining 56.5 5.3 38.2
LA5 Minimum notice periods 80.2 4.6 15.3
LA7 Rates of injury/absenteeism by region 24.4 73.3 2.3
LA8 Education/training workforce and families 17.6 69.5 13.0
LA10 Training hours per year, by employment category 51.9 35.1 13.0
LA13 Composition of governance bodies 29.0 69.5 1.5
LA14 Salary ratio: men/women 87.0 1.5 11.5
Notes: The ﬁgures in each column indicate the percentage number of TNCs.
17 https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/G3andG3-1/guidelines-online/G31Online/StandardDisclosures/LaborPracticesAndDecentWork/Pages/default.aspx
‚under the heading Relevance (Accessed 9 March 2016).
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diﬀerent regions. As an example, the compilations for LA7 specify that companies should provide a breakdown of rates of injuries and
absenteeism by regions. Our ﬁndings show that hardly any company had reported on the lost day rate, occupational disease rate, or
absentee rate for independent contractors in diﬀerent regions. Disclosures were also low when companies had to present statistics for
diﬀerent categories such as minority groups, gender and age categories.
6.1.2. Human rights indicators
Of the six human rights indicators, investment and procurement practices (HR1) and suppliers screened for human rights (HR2) were
the least disclosed indicators (with 92% non-disclosure for HR1 and 81% for HR2 – see Table 3). These two indicators also had the
lowest full (and overall) disclosures (HR1 at 3.1% for full disclosure and 7.7% for overall disclosure and HR2 at 3.8% and 19.1%,
respectively).
The compilations for HR1 (see Table 4) reveal that slightly more companies (8%) had reported on the number of signiﬁcant
investment agreements that included human rights clauses than on the signiﬁcant investments agreements that had undergone human rights
Table 2
Compilations for Tested Disclosure on Labour Indicators.
Indicators and their compilations Companies reporting each
compilation
LA1 Workforce by employment type:
Total workforce (broken down by employees & supervised workers) 26%
Total workforce by type of contract 40%
Total workforce by type of employment 38%
Total workforce broken down by region 58%
LA2 Turnover by age/gender/region:
Total number leaving employment by gender 9%
Rate of employees leaving by gender 14%
Total number leaving by age group 5%
vRate of employees leaving by age group 6%
Total number leaving by region 15%
Rate of employees leaving by region 20%
LA4 Percentage workforce covered by collective bargaining
% of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements.a 38%
LA5 Minimum notice periods
The minimum number of weeks’ notice typically provided to employees and their elected representatives prior to the
implementation of signiﬁcant operational changes that could substantially aﬀect them.
15%
LA7 Rates of injury/absenteeism by region
Injury rate (IR) for total workforce by region 8%
IR for contractors by regions 5%
Occupational diseases rate (ODR) for total workforce by region 6%
ODR for contractors by region 3%
Lost day rate (LDR) for total workforce by region 6%
(LDR) for independent contractors by region 4%
Absentee rate (AR) for total workforce by region. 5%
AR for independent contractors by region 1%
Absolute (Abs) number of fatalities for total workforce by region 15%
Abs number of fatalities for contractors by region 11%
LA8 Education/training workforce and families regarding serious illnesses/diseases
Education/training program(s) to assist workforce members, their families or community members 31%
Counselling program(s) to assist workforce members, their families or community members 16%
Prevention/Risk control program(s) to assist work force members, their families or community members 24%
Treatment program(s) to assist workforce members, their families or community members 21%
LA10 Training hours per year, by employment category
Average hours of training per year per employee by category.b 13%
LA13 Composition of governance bodies
% employees in the gender category 80%
% employees in minority groups 26%
% employees by age group (under 30; 30–50; 50+) 33%
% individuals in governance bodies by gender 70%
% individuals in governance bodies by minority groups 15%
% of individuals in governance bodies by age group 11%
LA14 Salary ratio: men/women
Ratio of salary of women to salary of men by employee category. 11%
a For LA4 and LA5, partial reporting was coded in all cases where companies reported on regions but not the whole organisation.
b For LA10 and LA14, partial reporting was coded when companies reported on the indicator but not by category.
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screening (4%). In the case of HR2, more companies (9%) reported on the actions they took as a result of their human rights screening
than outlined their human rights screening criteria on their suppliers and contractors (about 5%). The inclusion of human rights
clauses or screening of contract would have required systematic and concerted eﬀorts to actively engage with suppliers so that the
external workforce likely to be aﬀected by the TNC’s operations could be protected from human rights breaches. The most reported
indicators were child labour (HR6 at 26+31.3=57% – see Table 3), forced labour (HR7 at 26+ 29=55%) and risk to freedom of
association (HR5 at 24.4+ 26.7= 51.1%). Looking at their compilations, a much smaller proportion of TNCs had reported that they
had procedures to identify those operations subject to signiﬁcant risk of either child labour, forced labour or freedom of association
(31%, 30% and 27%, respectively). While companies were paying more attention to child labour, forced labour and risks to freedom of
association (HR6, HR7 and HR5), less attention was being paid to broader human rights issues such as investment and procurement
practices and supplier screening (HR1, HR2). Overall, TNCs hesitance to report on procedures used to identify breaches of human rights
issues (e.g., the ﬁrst compilation for: HR1, HR2, HR5–HR7) is indicative of how little attention they are paying to systematically
approaching human rights aspects of their external workforces.
6.2. Over-claimed disclosures
The close examination of reports revealed that, overall, companies were exaggerating, in their index tables, the level of in-
formation they were claiming to be disclosing in the reports. In the following sub-sections, we analyse the extent of reporting, and
over-claiming, for the Labour and Human Rights indicators.
6.2.1. Labour indicators
The results (see Table 5) suggest that companies over-claimed their disclosures for all LA categories in their index tables. The
highest over-claiming was for equality (LA13) at 73%, education and training regarding serious illnesses and diseases (LA8 at 63%),
employment (LA1 at 64%) and rates of injury/absenteeism by region (LA7 at 56%). Looking at the compilations for each of the three
indicators (Table 2), we see that the scores for most compilations are very low.
Table 3
Tested Disclosures for Human Rights Indicators.
(1) No Disclosure (2) Partial Disclosure (3) Full Disclosure
Human Rights Indicators % % %
HR1 Investment and procurement practices 92.4 4.6 3.1
HR2 Suppliers screened for human rights 80.9 15.3 3.8
HR4 Incidents of discrimination 62.6 11.5 26.0
HR5 Risks to freedom of association 48.9 24.4 26.7
HR6 Risk of child labour 42.7 26.0 31.3
HR7 Risk of forced labour 45 26.0 29.0
Notes: The ﬁgures in each column indicate the percentage number of companies.
Table 4
Compilations for Tested Disclosure on Human Rights Indicators.
Indicators and their compilations Companies reporting each compilation
HR1 Investment and procurement practices
Percentage and total number of signiﬁcant investment agreements that include human rights clauses 8%
Percentage and total number of signiﬁcant investment agreements that have undergone human rights screening 4%
HR2 Suppliers screened for human rights
Contracts that include criteria and have undergone screening on human rights. 5%
Contracts that were subjected to actions taken as a result of HR screening. 9%
HR4 Incidents of discrimination
Total number of incidents of discrimination 27%
Report concrete actions taken 33%
HR5 Risks to freedom of association
Operations identiﬁed in which the right to exercise freedom or association and collective bargaining may be at
signiﬁcant risk.
27%
Measures taken by the organisation to support these rights. 50%
HR6 Risk of child labour
Operations identiﬁed as having signiﬁcant risk for incidents of child labour 31%
Measures taken to contribute to the elimination of child labour 58%
HR7 Risk of forced labour
Operations identiﬁed as having signiﬁcant risk for incidents of compulsory labour 30%
Measures taken to contribute to the elimination of forced labour 54%
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Evidence for LA13 revealed that companies had reported on the gender composition (80% and 70% – see Table 2) but not on their
minorities (15%). Nonetheless, most of these companies declared themselves as full disclosures while they had reported only on some
of the compilations. Companies’ provision of general statements about their policies and procedures rather than the provision of
speciﬁc statistics as outlined in the guidelines is another illustration of companies recognising the importance attached to diversity in
their governance structures. Below is an instance where a company claimed full disclosure but included none of the relevant statistics
to supports its claims:
‘We realigned the governance of our global diversity activities …. As a result, Diversity Operating Committees led by the four
regional CEOs and senior managers are now responsible for implementing our global strategy in line with regional requirements.
We have also reviewed our global diversity strategy and are now drawing on the support of members of the Executive Board as
well as the Board of Directors in this area. … Initial progress has already been achieved in Asia Paciﬁc and Europe.’
(Credit Suisse, 2008, p. 31)
Another similar example from AEGON states:
‘ … that greater diversity within its workforce brings clear beneﬁts to its business: By creating a wider, more diverse pool of talent.
By improving the company’s understanding of its customer base and broadening its appeal to diﬀerent customer segments. By
further strengthening AEGON’s brand and reputation.’
(AEGON, 2010, p. 60)
Other examples include Rosenft and China Mobile, which provided unrelated statistics (e.g., staﬀ training or the number of
managers at diﬀerent levels) but failed to include breakdowns by minorities or age group.
For LA8, full reporting requires companies to list assistance programmes oﬀered to their employees and their families in the form
of education, counselling, prevention/risk and treatment/health for serious illnesses and diseases. The guidelines do not require
companies to report on (or indeed have) all of these in order to comply with ‘full disclosure’, but where such programmes are oﬀered,
it must be speciﬁed whether they are oﬀered to workers, workers’ families or communities. Some companies stated that the com-
munity’s welfare is not seen as a priority for them as ‘Education, training, counselling, prevention, and risk-control programmes to
assist other people or community members regarding serious diseases are usually a governmental responsibility’ (Adecco, 2008, p.
62). Depending on the location, this may be legitimate. It could also be an attempt to deﬂect attention from what is deemed to be
unfavourable information. Another relevant example relates to the ICBC, a Chinese Bank which claimed to have fully disclosed
information in adherence to LA8 guidelines while the actual examination of their report revealed full compliance with only 2 of the 8
compilations. They stated:
‘The Bank has continued to step up investment in employee training, extended avenues of training, gradually establishing a
competency-based training system that instils a working culture of career development among employees. The “Six Libraries” …
were established to continue to enrich the training resources of the Bank, and new training methods … were introduced.’
(ICBC, 2010, pp. 89–90)
The bank reported no information about counselling programmes for the families of the workforce. Another example is from
China Mobile, which claimed full disclosure but scored zero for all compilations. The company discussed issues related to LA8 but
failed to provide any relevant statistics, stating that:
‘In order to eﬀectively guarantee employee health and safety, we have continuously strengthened our workplace health and safety
management systems and policies by establishing health records for employees and providing regular medical examinations and
health related information and training, and have achieved good results.’
(China Mobile, 2009, p. 17)
A slightly diﬀerent point emerges under the guidelines set out for LA1. Here, companies are expected to report on four major
aspects: total workforce, employment contract (whether permanent or ﬁxed contract), employment type (whether full-time or part-
time) and their workforce in diﬀerent regions. While the majority of companies in our sample had reported on their total workforce,
Table 5
Over-claimed Disclosures for Labour Indicators.
Over-claimed (Disclosed less than claimed)
Labour Indicators (%)
LA1 Workforce by employment type 64
LA2 Turnover by age/gender/region 47
LA4 % workforce covered by collective bargaining 26
LA5 Minimum notice periods 37
LA7 Rates of injury/absenteeism by region 56
LA8 Education/training workforce and families 63
LA10 Training hours per year, by employment category 51
LA13 Composition of governance bodies 73
LA14 Salary ratio: men/women 28
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most companies failed to report on the employment contract, employment type or their workforce in diﬀerent regions. The failure to
disclose one of the four aspects meant that the majority of companies which had declared ‘full disclosure’ were reclassiﬁed as only
‘partially disclosing’. For example, JP Morgan Chase had declared disclosure by stating that they employ ‘…approximately 240,000
men and women in more than 60 countries.’ (JP Morgan Chase, 2010, p. 65), failing to provide a breakdown of the total workforce in
each region and in terms of employment contract and employment type. Employment contract and employment type were the two
categories least well reported by companies, which suggests a high degree of caution in disclosing statistics related to workers in
precarious employment. While the over-claiming indicates that companies recognise the importance attached to the key aspects of
employment contracts, the failure to provide all the statistics set out in the GRI guidelines could be due to the absence of a systematic
approach to gathering data.
Some of the compilations for LA1 were not reported by companies from certain countries. As shown in Table 2, the breakdown of
information on regions, type of contracts, type of employment and supervised workforce was low. For example, PetroChina had
claimed full adherence to LA1 by providing the following general statement with no relevant statistics:
‘We strictly adhere to the Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China, Labor Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China and
other relevant regulations of jurisdictions in which our shares are listed and we rigorously fulﬁl international conventions endorsed
by the Chinese government. We have established a sound employment management system covering labor contracts, remunerations,
insurance and beneﬁts, performance evaluation, rewards and penalties and professional training.’
(PetroChina, 2008, p. 35) (Emphasis added)
Interestingly, this company is explicitly declaring its full compliance with those international conventions that are endorsed by
the Chinese government. In other words, their non-disclosures could be those which are not endorsed by the government and hence
not reported. Nonetheless, the company decided to claim full disclosure in their GRI index table, most likely to maintain or increase
their legitimacy, certainly not as a sincere attempt to identify the key issues as set out in the guidelines. This is consistent with the
ﬁndings of Diouf and Boiral (2017) that companies select, adapt or modify GRI indicators to cater a favourable image among their
stakeholders.
The indicators which attracted the best levels of accurate reporting (the lowest levels of over-claiming) were percentage of
workforce covered by collective bargaining (LA4 at 26%) and salary ratio: men/women (LA14 at 28%). Looking at Table 2, both LA4 and
LA14 have only one compilation. For LA4, the overall disclosure (5.3+ 38.2= 43.5%, – see Table 1) was not particularly high. For
LA14, see above, the indicator is relatively recent and hence the possible unavailability of the data.
In summary, we observed that in many cases of over-claiming, detailed information was either not deemed ‘relevant’ to the
company or not required by national legislation. For example, many companies did not provide regional information for their
minorities. In some countries, regional data or data on minorities are considered politically sensitive to report. In such cases,
companies provided no relevant explanation yet still claimed ‘full’ disclosure. While some compilations may not necessarily be of
interest to their internal workforce, they may be so for their global investors, customers and suppliers. What is interesting is that
many companies have decided to claim ‘full’ disclosure irrespective of the alleged ‘irrelevance’, to them, of some of the compilations.
In the case of non-relevance (and hence no materiality to their internal workforce), companies are expected to explain non-disclosure
if they report information with the intention of raising their transparency rather than attaining and maintaining legitimacy.
6.2.2. Human rights indicators
The indicators for investment and procurement practices (HR1) and suppliers screened for human rights (HR2) had the highest over-
claiming at 54% and 60% (see Table 6). For these two indicators, most companies provided general statements rather than the
speciﬁc statistics required by the GRI guidelines and only 9% or less had complied with the 4 compilations (see Table 4), indicating
that companies hardly reported any human rights issues relating to their workforce in their value chains. Nonetheless, they clearly
realised the importance attached to these issues and may have considered non-reporting as a threat to their legitimacy or to be
regarded as less legitimate.
For HR1, the following two examples are common for the majority of companies that claimed full disclosure but had in eﬀect
reported none:
‘ABB maintains and regularly reviews a list of sensitive countries where it has, or considers engaging in, business operations.
Human rights, as well as legal, ﬁnancial and security criteria, are included in risk assessments, and are among the factors in
deciding whether ABB does business in a particular country. Based partly or wholly on human rights considerations, ABB has not
Table 6
Over-claimed Disclosures for Human Rights Indicators.
Human Rights Indicators Over-claimed (Disclosed less than claimed)
HR1 Investment and procurement practices 54
HR2 Suppliers screened for human rights 60
HR4 Incidents of discrimination 17
HR5 Risks to freedom of association 30
HR6 Risk of child labour 34
HR7 Risk of forced labour 35
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taken any business with Myanmar or North Korea for several years. ABB completed its withdrawal from Sudan in June 2009,
having taken no new business in the country since January 2007.’
(ABB, 2010, p. 25)
‘Bayer pays special attention to respect for human rights. Our Supplier Code of Conduct is based on the principles of the Global
Compact and also takes up the sustainability principles and our Human Rights Position.’
(Bayer, 2010, p. 33)
And for HR2:
‘We also advocate the observation of employee rights even outside of our own company. Our procurement principles, which are
applicable worldwide, require that our suppliers strictly comply with the respective national legislation and recognize equality of
opportunity as well as the right to collective bargaining and adequate minimum wages and beneﬁts. If any of our business partners
fundamentally violates one of those principles, we terminate the business relationship with them.’
(Deutsche Bank, 2010, p. 68)
‘We will work with all our suppliers to ensure they meet the ten principles of the Global Compact to guarantee an ethical supply
chain. We want to ensure that our supply chain is “ethical” … we want our suppliers and contractors to work towards the same
high levels of human rights, labour standards and environmental management that we aspire to. … we are a signatory to the UN
Global Compact, and we are committed to promoting responsible business practice within our sphere of inﬂuence, so we have
begun with an internal improvement project to re-assess our suppliers, and to revise our contracts. Any new supplier for EDF
Energy will have to be GC compliant.’
(EDF, 2008, p. 26)
In all four examples, companies provide general information, occasionally interesting relevant information, but without ad-
dressing the speciﬁc information items (as per GRI guidelines). Bayer and EDF, for example, made reference to the adoption of the
Global Compact by their suppliers, ignoring the GRI guidelines on screening suppliers for breaches of human rights. The two
companies are typical examples of companies reporting relevant and interesting information to either deviate attention from key
issues (Lindblom’s second strategy) or change their audience’s perception of what the key issues are by associating themselves to
symbols (Global Compact, GRI) (Lindblom’s third or fourth strategy). In contrast, Deutsche Bank alludes to national legislation on
human rights, stating that they encourage their suppliers to respect the local national legislation rather than endeavouring to set up
their own screening procedures for identifying risks to human rights. The GRI has set out speciﬁc guidelines as to how companies
should approach human rights within their value chains. Under the guidelines, it is for the TNC to take courses of action, system-
atically screen and tackle human rights risks associated with their operations, rather than passing on the responsibilities to their local
suppliers so that they can adhere with the local rules and regulations, leaving the question of what if some of the local norms, rules
and regulations are either ambivalent to or in contradiction with the deﬁnition of human rights as set out by the GRI guidelines?
In contrast to the above, the lowest level of over-claiming is for incidents of discrimination (HR4 at 17%). Many companies stated
that they had fully adhered to the guidelines and had no incidents of discriminations to report on (e.g., Lukoil, Repsol-YPF, Iberdrola).
While on average 30% of companies had reported HR4, about 38% (i.e., 26%+11.5% – see Table 3) had either ‘partially’ or ‘fully’-
reported on incidents of discrimination. A closer examination shows that the two compilations of HR4 are reported by more or less
the same number of companies. An example of a company claiming ‘full disclosure’ but in fact only ‘partially’ disclosing is ABB and an
example of a company claiming to report partial but providing no disclosure is Deutsche Post:
‘All countries in ABB’s sustainability management program are asked to report any incidents of discrimination. Six cases of
discrimination and 18 of harassment were reported in 2010, resulting in a range of disciplinary measures.’
(ABB, 2010, p. 26)
‘Although Deutsche Post DHL is committed to managing diversity professionally and to creating a working environment that is
free from discrimination, we do not publish data for this aspect. We do not report on the total number of incidents of dis-
crimination or actions taken.’
(Deutsche Post DHL, 2010, p. 221)
Another example for HR4 is Rosneft, claiming full disclosure by stating its full adherence with the Russian legislation on human
rights (not with those of the GRI) without stating what they are and how eﬀectively they are enforced. This is similar to the Deutsch
Bank example discussed earlier:
‘In its activities, the Company adheres to the existing legislation prohibiting any form of human rights violation. Due to the nature
of Company’ activities and the existing Russian legislation, there is no signiﬁcant risk of human rights violation by suppliers and
contractors. In addition, in the process of deﬁning report content this issue has not been found material.’
(Rosneft, 2010, p.90)
The most consistent reporting with the highest total disclosures (partial plus full disclosure) were for HR6 (at 57.3% – see Table 3)
and HR7 (at 55% – see Table 3). The following examples of HR6 and HR7 are from: (1) KEPCO claiming full disclosure for HR6 while
reporting no relevant information and (2) Fiat claiming full disclosure for HR7 but only partially reporting the information:
‘KEPCO is strictly complying with the Labor Standard Act of Korea, ILO convention (No. 105 concerning the abolition of forced
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labor) and the labor standards of the 10 Principles of the Global Compact.
(KEPCO, 2009, p. 57)
‘… there is no use of child or forced labor at [our] plants or plants of [our] suppliers. Every two years, the Group conducts a review
to determine whether child labor is being used. On the basis of the latest analysis of 90% of employees outside Italy conducted in
2009, no company was found to have personnel under the minimum legal age to begin work or an apprenticeship under local
legislation or, in any event, under ﬁfteen, even in countries where the minimum legal age is lower.’
(Fiat, 2010, p. 32)
The example from KEPCO is another case of a company using its adherence to its national legislation as a justiﬁcation for claiming
full adherence with the GRI guidelines without doing so and without stating which speciﬁc aspects of the Korean legislation are in
line with those of the GRI guidelines. In other words, in the absence of any mandatory external checks to ensure that companies
reported on the speciﬁc aspects of the GRI as claimed in their GRI index tables, they can easily use their index tables as a platform to
adopt diﬀerent legitimacy strategies. In cases where companies pass on the responsibility for human rights to their suppliers, they
claim full disclosure and provide an explanation, attempting to alter the societal expectations by aligning them with the way they
report on how the key issues are dealt with in practice (as opposed to how as per GRI guidelines) (i.e., the fourth strategy).
For HR1 and HR2, companies recognise the importance of their value chains as over half of them over-claimed that they had
reported on the two key indicators related to their value chains in their GRI index tables. This is further supported by the fact that
nearly half of the companies reported on their child labour and forced labour practices. More speciﬁcally, companies reported on the
measures they had taken to prevent the incidents of child labour and forced labour but did not report on such incidents to begin with.
The two latter indicators (i.e., HR6 and HR7) were the second most popular indicators that companies over-claimed. Considering that
value chains and the issues pertinent to them had recently become more topical (Gold, Seuring, & Beske, 2010) prior to the time when
we collected data and hence subject to more scrutiny (e.g., Porter & Kramer, 2011; Tate, Ellram, & Kirchoﬀ, 2010), our evidence can
be one of the ﬁrst indicating a low level of exposure by companies. However, with the increasing attention paid to sustainability
issues in value chains and the realisation of a sustainability-related value chain risk management (Hofmann, Busse, Bode, & Henke,
2013), TNCs are bound to pay more attention to their labour and human rights issues at national and international levels.
7. Discussion and concluding remarks
With awareness of breaches of labour rights and human rights increasing, more attention is paid to the fair treatment of the
workforce in global value chains. TNCs are increasingly under pressure to provide an account of how fairly and ethically they treat
their workforce. In this paper, we focus on the largest TNCs and closely examine the information they reported on their external as
well as their internal workforce in their value chains, having adopted the GRI reporting guidelines on the labour practices and human
rights and declaring the status of their compliance with each speciﬁc aspect in an index table. While TNCs in our sample generally
realise the signiﬁcance attached to their external workforce, evidence of over-claiming on all indicators suggests that TNCs fail to pay
close attention to the reporting guidelines.
The GRI core indicators are generally ‘material’ to most companies (GRI, 2011, p. 7). However, in those cases where some
information may not be material to some companies, the speciﬁc cases can be identiﬁed and their non-materiality declared – with
reasons – in the reports. The GRI sets out clear guidelines on the materiality of the information which require companies not only to
identify the key issues but also to actively engage with their stakeholders. While the absence of materiality could be an issue on some
GRI categories (e.g., major oil spillages under EN GRI categories, not under scrutiny, here), it is diﬃcult to see how any of the labour
or human rights categories, deﬁned under the GRI guidelines, could allow any company to exempt themselves. However, attempting
to justify material exemption should at least be transparent. Instead, we found numerous cases of TNCs reporting large volumes of
irrelevant information (as also observed by Fortanier et al., 2011) as a means of deviating from the key information disclosure
required. There appeared to be a tendency among some TNCs to claim full disclosure in their GRI index tables (S8, S6 and S4 – see
Fig. 1) even though, in the report itself, the absence of core details were explained away as being irrelevant to home country
government regulatory requirements. In cases of over-claiming, we found hardly any evidence of companies ﬂagging how they dealt
with diﬃcult situations or the impediments they encountered in practice. While some companies could have highlighted inherent
discrepancies, which to a large extent, are expected across diverse locations, they instead chose to claim ‘full disclosure’ and failed to
provide the required information. At best, some over-claiming companies acknowledged that they operated in full adherence to ‘local’
rules and regulations without any further discussion of what these rules were, how they diﬀered from the recommended guidelines,
or how they impeded them from full or partial compliance with the GRI guidelines. One of the essential aspects of TNCs reporting
information as an eﬀort to discharge their accountability, is the acknowledgement of impediments they face or the weaknesses in
their systems; issues which, if not acknowledged and discussed, can never be addressed or remedied. Our examination of the reports
revealed none of these. Most TNCs were complacent about the guidelines at a practical level and to the question of whether they
could implement them (reﬂecting, somewhat the ﬁndings of Barrientos & Smith, 2007). The geographical dispersion of TNCs’ op-
erations is one of the main features of global value chains that can result in considerable discrepancies in how TNCs treat their
workforce (Edwards & Kuruvilla, 2005). This was not reﬂected or acknowledged in the majority of the reports we examined and TNCs
were selective in adopting the guidelines (Diouf & Boiral, 2017; Lauwo et al., 2016).
In essence, having the option to claim high compliance with the GRI guidelines was treated by TNCs as a tool to convey that they
were ‘doing well’ in terms of their workforce. While TNCs reported more on high proﬁle aspects related to their internal workforce
(such as ‘employment type’, ‘rates of injuries and absenteeism by region’, ‘education and training of the workforce and their families
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regarding serious illnesses’ and ‘the composition of the boards’), they paid considerably less attention to human rights aspects (such
as ‘risk of child labour’, ‘risk of forced labour’ and ‘risks to freedom of association’). There were notable weaknesses in providing
detailed statistics, breaking down information on internal workforce (e.g., statistics per: region, age groups, gender and for minority
groups) as well as presenting detailed information on external workforce in value chains. This could be associated with TNCs’ failure
to either invest in systematic data gathering or recognise the importance attached to such information or identify and acknowledge
material diﬀerences. Instead, we came across spurious statistics coupled with many statements of intent.
While the GRI has made a valuable attempt to introduce some form of standardisation in order to elevate the quality of in-
formation by focusing on a number of characteristics including transparency, materiality and comparability of information (e.g., GRI
Standards Glossary 2016, p. 11; Reynolds & Yuthas, 2008; Sutantoputra, 2009), a lot more needs to be done. Our evidence suggests
that those leading global companies that had explicitly claimed to have adopted the GRI guidelines on Labour Practices and Human
Rights did not necessarily present material information that would result in enhanced transparency and would allow meaningful
comparability. Indeed, there appears to be a (deliberate) misinterpretation of the guidelines by TNCs, whereby TNCs easily over-
claimed their adherence to the guidelines without being found out or any independent external body ﬂagging out what TNCs did not
report and got away with. Our evidence that TNCs may have adopted a number of diﬀerent legitimacy strategies is just a small
indication of how the absence of any meaningful (mandatory) external audit has led the GRI guidelines to serve purposes other than
those originally intended. Some of the guidelines (e.g., for HR1 and HR2) are devised to encourage stakeholder engagement in
developing countries. Again, this was almost non-existent when we examined the reports. The identiﬁcation of key issues and
acknowledgement of material weaknesses (as suggested by Roberts, 2009) and active engagement with (the local) stakeholders are
important facets of corporate accountability (Campbell, 2005; Cooper & Owen, 2007).
The overwhelming evidence of over-claiming could be a manifestation of ‘organisational hypocrisy’ (Brunsson, 1989) about their
workforces in response to reputational competitive pressures and the desire to project a legitimate image (e.g., see Brunsson, 2003, p.
221). More generally, it reﬂects the predominance of neoliberalism (Lauwo et al., 2016; Sikka, 2010, 2015) whereby all the systems
and measures including accounting (actors, techniques and conventions) (Chiapello, 2017) are designed to privilege ﬁnancial capital
without paying meaningful attention to the rights and welfare of labour. TNCs’ failure and, to a large extent, ambivalence to reporting
material issues not only reﬂects TNC’s unsystematic approach and lax attitude towards reporting but highlights a much more
poignant problem that in the absence of any systematic scrutiny and pressures that would highlight TNCs’ hypocrisies and hold them
to account, there is unlikely to be any changes in corporate behaviours and, more importantly, to their organisational culture.
With the GRI reporting guidelines being replaced by the new GRI Sustainability Reporting Standards18 from 1 July 2018, ‘ma-
teriality’ has remained central to reporting standards. As a standard setter, the GRI does not consider its role to check the content of
the reports to ensure that TNCs have reported in accordance with its standards (see GRI 101, p. 26), and it remains for the TNCs to
seek assurance provisions. Given the observed level of exaggeration and that many TNCs in our sample disingenuously stated that
some indicators do not apply to them, there is a need to independently check the ‘completeness’ of stated disclosures and openly
publish the results. While this independent examination can be funded by companies that wish to receive accreditation on what they
have reported, there is a range of key issues that need to be considered and addressed here. For example, under whose jurisdiction
might this independent examination take place? How would the independence of such examination be ensured? How well-informed
would the examiners be about workforce related issues within diﬀerent national borders, especially in developing countries and
emerging markets where civil society institutions are often weak or non-existent? In our view, the presence of strong and functional
civil society institutions (e.g., NGOs, trade unions, free media and other supportive mechanisms) within diﬀerent national borders are
essential if TNCs are to be monitored for the treatment of their workforce in their value chains. This cannot be achieved unless
national governments in developing countries and emerging markets legally acknowledge the importance of social activist groups and
grant them the freedom (as well as the protection needed) to operate freely and independently. At the same time, national gov-
ernments need to devise the necessary legal and regulatory requirements with eﬀective enforcement mechanisms to protect their
workforce.
Our recommendations resonate with similar calls by recent studies on developing countries for substantial regulatory, policy and
institutional reforms (e.g., Belal, Cooper, & Khan, 2015; Lauwo et al., 2016). Belal and Roberts (2010), for example, recommend that
the core aspects of CSR reporting should be made mandatory in Bangladesh but doing so would require the eﬀective implementation
of law enforcement agencies to be strengthened and adequately resourced. Similarly, Lauwo et al. (2016) raises concerns over the
adequacy and eﬀectiveness of legal and regulatory requirements and calls for a more proactive role by government. A more sup-
portive role by government can have deﬁning impacts on CSR initiatives (as found by Rahman, 2017).
Another recommendation would be for TNCs to include representation of their internal workforce in their governance structures.
Future research could compare TNCs that are headquartered in institutional environments with opposing approaches to their
workforce in their governance structures (e.g., Anglo-Saxon versus stakeholder approach governance mechanisms) to explore any
notable diﬀerences in the extent and nature of how the two groups of TNCs report on their internal and external workforce. German-
based TNCs, being from a co-ordinated market economy (CME), have employees systematically involved in their governance
structures and in various aspects of business activity (Hiss, 2009). By contrast, British TNCs, being from a liberal market economy
(LME), have no employee representation in their governance structures and are characterised with weak employee voice and operate
within a minimalist legislative employment framework (e.g., Muller-Camen, Croucher, Flynn, & Schroder, 2011). How might such
diﬀerences inﬂuence the treatment of, and reporting on, the external workforce? While there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in certain
18 The G3 guidelines were replaced by G4 in 2013 and this centred materiality as the core of the report. The GRI Standards did not change this.
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aspects of human resource management practices of companies from LMEs and CMEs (e.g., Farndale, Brewster, & Poutsma, 2008),
future research can broaden our understanding of how diﬀerences in governance mechanisms of these archetype TNCs (e.g.,
Bottenberg, Tuschke, & Flickinger, 2017) set the remits for their workforce reporting in view of their internal structural contexts and
support mechanisms and how diﬀerently they respond to prevailing neoliberal forces at play in their national and global environ-
ments (as suggested by Chiapello, 2017).
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